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Ethics are central to social education, and making ethical decisions underlies the purpose of teaching critical thinking and interpretive skills in the classroom. The point in acquiring these skills is to apply them in the real world when
deciding "what ought to be," "right from wrong," and "good
from bad." Few educational philosophers would disagree up
to this point. However, when discussion begins on how to
teach ethics, beliefs diverge considerably.
Ironically, both the extreme left and extreme right wings
of educational thought seek the same end, that of ethics
inculcation. Inculcation of anything is a dangerous if not
unethical proposition. Inculcation is a pernicious method, used
by totalitarian states, that runs counter to student-centered,
progressive education in a democratic society. The logical
response to the maligning realities of inculcation is that some
ethical behaviors, such as honesty or bravery, are intrinsically "good" and deserve teacher modeling and wholesale
student acceptance. But buying into any value, without logically arriving at the utility of such a value for a particular
situation, renders it meaningless for the student. For instance,
many situations dictate that we must not be honest or brave
to attain an ethically and positively "good" outcome. Thus,
rather than inculcation, ethics in a democratic society must
be taught as a flexible system, arrived at through logic and
reason, that ultimately situates students to act in ways that
are ethically sound.
This thesis unfolds in five parts. The first begins with
the premise that social education is central to education and
that ethics are the par excellence of social education. The
second part deals with the far left of the educational spectrum, specifically the inculcating views of multiculturalists.
The third area focuses on the conservative side, and its push
for certain unquestionable universal ethical codes. An eclectic solution, based primarily on the philosophy of Deweyan
pragmatism and various ethical theories, follows the conservative view and offers progressive alternatives to this most
essential element of education. The final section contains the
implications of teaching ethics in schools in light of these
three perspectives, with a view toward further inquiry.

The Centrality of Ethics Education
When we reflect on why we ultimately teach certain
topics, why we teach in certain ways, and what we want
students to be able to do after their experience in social
education, the answer is almost always the same. We want
students to think critically; to be inquisitive; to be a positive
and active member of society; to be a good citizen; and to
have tolerance, honesty, character, integrity, and generosity.
Formed by its largest professional organization, the primary
p u r p o s e of social e d u c a t i o n is to " h e l p y o u n g p e o p l e
develop the ability to make informed and reasoned decisions
for the public good as citizens of a culturally diverse,
democratic society in an interdependent world." 1 The focus
of this statement is decisions or, stated m o r e precisely,
ethical decision making, which is the business of social
education. O t h e r s build upon this broad definition and
suggest that the point of our work is to help students attain
civic competence and become familiar with the skills and
dispositions that are necessary for active membership in a
democratic society. 2 Still others view social education as having an a priori r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t p u r p o s e , w h e r e t h e
ultimate goal is to position students to be part of a new social
order that reconstructs society along the lines of social
justice and reform. 3
All of these goals and desired outcomes have one commonality. Each mission requires that in some capacity we
want students to be able to reason, think, and determine what
ought to be. The reason why students must learn these sophisticated skills is to be able to make informed ethical decisions, which is further translated into being a positive influence in society. Thus, since ethics are central to the purposes
of social education, it seems odd that ethical philosophy, and
philosophy in general, is rarely offered as a course, and a
rigorous treatment of the topic is not found in most classrooms. When realized in the powerful light of philosophy,
the arguments for the appropriate methods of teaching ethics
are exceedingly divergent and polemic. The educational
philosophy that espouses relativism and multiculturalism
attempts to equate cultural norms, at the expense of cultural
universals, which is a problematic assertion at best.
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Far-Left, Multiculturalism, and Relativism
Most multiculturalists view cultural values as a remedy
for educational issues and suggest that the cardinal mission
of the public schools is to develop in students values related
to this view. Many multiculturalists posit that a student's education should be centered in his or her own cultural value
system. 4 It follows logically that education should form around
arbitrary cultural value systems, which is a direct inculcation
of relativist ethics. Multiculturalists suggest that ethical codes
are subjectively, politically, and culturally contextualized, the
result of which is that no knowledge claim has universal validity and no consensus on rules and values can be achieved.
Furthermore, multiculturalists use a theory that denies the
possibility of consensus, since all standards are politically
and culturally determined. 5 The logical conclusion of these
multicultural views is that all cultures have ethical codes that
are legitimate in themselves, simply by nature of emanating
from a "culture," and each culture's ethical system is relatively equal to any other. Giving ethical license to any group
based on achieved status as a "culture" not only skirts the
issue of having to "offend anyone," it is also intellectually
perplexing. By not being critical of cultures, including our
own, and their ethical beliefs, we run the risk of never achieving any sort of ethics education based on a democratically
oriented habit of mind.
Cultural relativism seeks to avoid ethical issues because
each culture will maintain a sacrosanct stance. Rather than
rationally seeking a resolution to ethical issues, relativists
suggest that each culture can construct its own values for its
own members, but these values should neither be used to judge
other societies, nor should other societies judge them. Once
the members of one culture define the ethical "good," discussion of the issue apparently ends and the opportunity for
further discourse ceases. 6 The result of cultural relativism is
intellectual and ethical stagnation, where the search for common knowledge and progress halts.
The oppressive nature of rational, analytic, and logical
thought is central to radical educational theory, postmodernist
theory, and relativism. Postmodernists seek to break from
"hegemonic logic" 7 due to its supposed intrusion on cultures
that rely more on emotions and relationships to find resolutions to ethical dilemmas. This idea naturally falls apart when
we start to discuss international human rights, the mutilations of genitalia in certain cultures, as well as demonstrations by extremist groups in the United States. Contradictions abound as witnessed by relativists who seek ethnic independence but at the same time protest "international issues." However, before we examine the implications of inculcating relativism as the only correct ethical code, we must
first examine ethical relativism itself.
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Relativism posits a central argument that (a) morally right
and wrong actions vary from society to society, so there are
no universal moral standards held by all societies; (b) whether
or not it is right for individuals to act in a certain way depends on the society to which they belong; and (c)therefore,
there are no absolute or objective moral standards that apply
to all people, everywhere, and at all times. 8 The first disturbing consequence of this theory is that reformers are always
morally wrong since they go against the tide of cultural standards, resulting in a conclusion of progress as being "unethical." A second argument is that if moral relativism is true,
neither law nor civil disobedience will have a firm foundation. Civil disobedience would be morally wrong if a culture
agrees with the law in question, hence any "petition of grievances" as found in the United States Constitution, would be
unethical. Another problem associated with relativism is that
it is extremely difficult to define a culture or society. The
definition of certain cultures may stem from history, literature, language, ancestry, religion or geographic concern, and,
of course, race. Thus, if we deduce that every individual has
a distinct "culture," we might abandon any sort of rational
ethical, judicial, or political system. Ultimately, one could
justify any action through cultural approval, and therefore
we must view the perpetuation of such an action as a correct
ethical d e c i s i o n . 9 All of t h i s , of c o u r s e , a p p l i e s to a
multicultural, rather than monocultural, society.

The Far-Right, Conservatism, and

Universalism

The far-right's ethical education theory is much easier to
define, for they seek to inculcate a specific set of unquestioned values, rather than a general code. One sect within
this group is the moral literacy movement of Bennett, Keyes,
Limbaugh, et al., which seeks to ensure social order via "family religious values" in secular public schools. 10 The camp
headed by Diane Ravitch, though somewhat similar, seeks to
preserve a sense of the American community." She and others argue that if there is no community with an agreed upon
vision of liberty and justice, then there will be but a collection of divergent racial and ethnic cultures. If no larger sense
of community exists, then each group will want to teach their
own children in their own way and public education will cease
to exist. 12 While a sound argument, it implies that room exists for only one vision of ethics education. William Bennett
specifically defines what that singular vision should be.
Bennett debunks moral relativism as well as the process
of "values clarification," and he proposes ethics as a system
of universal truths that can be taught through rote memorization. 13 These universal ethics, supported by culture throughout time, must also be held by teachers. Bennett suggests that
teaching and exposing children to good character and inviting its imitation will transmit a moral foundation for ethics.
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H e suggests that one cannot teach morality without being
"committed to morality yourself." 1 4 If teachers can consistently act in ethically sound ways, with good moral character, in specific situations whereby that character and morality
is logically attained, it is an extraordinary and honorable goal.
But having a teacher act out these set values, and the desire
for students to follow these values, is flawed on at least two
counts.
First, if students take on the assumption that being honest is a moral action that should be universalized, they are
not asked to c o m e to that conclusion on their own. It is, as
stated earlier, meaningless to ask students to accept virtues
prima facie. Second, the case for "teaching ethics by example"
can be cut down deontologically. For instance, the actions of
a role model may contain malevolent motivations. Yet, the
o u t c o m e of these actions may, in fact, be "ethically good."
Nonetheless, their motivations remain inherently pernicious.
Affinity for role models limits the ethical cause for both student and teacher to teleological analysis, so that doing the
right thing for the wrong reason is morally permissible. Even
teaching about historical role models fails to offer any substantive ethical thought or reflection for the student. As Dewey
noted:
lessons about morals signify as a matter of course lessons in
what other people think about virtues and duties. It amounts to
something only in the degree in which pupils happen already
to be animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the
sentiments of others. Without such regard, it has no more influence on character than information about the mountains of
Asia.15
B e y o n d the case of role models, we must examine the
dangers of holding certain values as universally true. This is
a dangerous Hobbesian leap that borders on nazism, totalitarianism, and absence of thought. T h e first danger is that
teachers, administrators, and communities that endorse specific ethical views as being universally true assume these
views to not only be true, but unquestionable. Second, students exit their education having learned that they should always act a certain way, without having had any thought process that reaches the s a m e conclusion. Finally, when acting
in a society with an ethical f r a m e w o r k that one holds to be
universally true, intolerance and inflexibility will be the likely
result. O n a larger scale, universal ethics education is what
totalitarian states have consistently used to sustain their regimes.
A totalitarian state (as the most extreme example of authoritarian control) may take the position that the teacher ought to
cause students (1) to adopt or "take on" certain very specific
attitudes; (2) to develop a number of fairly specific habits acquired through a multitude of prescribed activities; (3) to accept the orthodox pattern of beliefs and values, in terms of
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which the approved habits and attitudes fit together and make
sense.16
Bennett found the characteristics of thoughtfulness, kindness,
honesty, respect for the law, k n o w i n g right f r o m wrong, and
love of country to b e the most desirable. 1 7 Teaching unquestioned patriotism and respect for the law undermines the entire purpose of social education and the promotion of rational thought in a democratic vein.
Universalists seek to inculcate unquestioned values for
many reasons. There is potential, if these values are questioned, that youth will accept the " w r o n g " beliefs if they open
their minds to new ideas. 18 Conservative assertions of universal virtues and truths naturally contain functionalist desires to limit change. But skirting "closed areas" that are often saturated with prejudices and taboos creates intellectual
and ethical stagnation. 1 9 Progressive education in a democracy d e m a n d s the continual questioning of beliefs and assertions.

Kohlberg and Values

Clarification

An alternative to relativism and universalism is Lawrence
Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning. Kohlberg's approach
suggests that moral reasoning is rooted in o n e ' s cognitive
abilities. Contained in this theory, six stages of moral cognitive development, with student ascension to the next highest
stage through examination of moral dilemmas, is seen as the
ideal. Conservatives criticize Kohlberg's approach stating that
the o u t c o m e of moral reasoning is "moral nihilism." 2 0 Rather
than learning specific values, Kohlberg suggests that students
grapple with dilemmas that tend to yield m o r e sophisticated
ethical domains. In addition to Kohlberg's theory, the "values clarification m o v e m e n t " has drawn considerable reaction. Values clarification elicits the j u d g m e n t and opinions of
a student with regard to a m o m e n t of "values dissonance."
Values clarification does not go further than eliciting awareness of values, however, and assumes that being aware of
o n e ' s values is an end in itself. 21 Obviously, values clarification does not go far enough, for it fails to utilize the last 2,500
years of philosophical thought on the issue.
Bennett has criticized the values clarification m o v e m e n t
as an avenue for students to clarify wants and desires and
asserting those as a f o r m of ethical relativism. 2 2 T h e moral
d i l e m m a approach is criticized by s o m e as wrongfully identifying a universally valid moral orientation that is historically and culturally particular. 2 3 Kohlberg's theory suggests
pure reasoning, void of any inculcation, but relies too heavily
upon cognitive development, albeit essential to our solution,
and not enough on the multitude of ethical theories and codes
drawn f r o m all cultures that students can use to solve moral
dilemmas.
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Implications of Ethics in Education
Deciding what ethical systems are chosen and how they
are taught is a divisive and volatile issue. For some it is one
of the most important struggles for hegemony now being
waged in American society. 24 The way in which ethics are
taught has cascading effects on social education. If relativism is the choice of ethics education, then what follows is
typically a relativistic view of American culture in history,
government, and sociology courses. An example of this permeating effect is any centric curriculum that attempts to decenter any shared values, thus promoting societal divisiveness.
A possible consequence of relativism in a multicultural
society is the erosion of the community, or common unity,
that holds us together (e.g. language, government, history,
and literature). When this sort of multiculturalism is practiced and t a u g h t , i n d i v i d u a l s find m e m b e r s h i p within
balkanized groups. Ultimately these groups can promote a
"centric" vision of education, particularly in history, whereby
the history of their group gains dominance over all others.
Militants of ethnicity contend that a main objective of public
education should be the protection, strengthening, celebration, and perpetuation of ethnic origins and identities, the result of which only seems to nourish prejudices, differences,
and antagonisms. 25 When these centrist visions become increasingly pronounced, they go beyond admirable histories
of groups and enter into the realm of "bad history." 26 Excessive centrist education pursues sociopolitical goals that are
not related to cultural freedom or intellectual excellence. In
addition, centrist education is not even "multicultural" because it focuses on one particular race as having priority over
others. 27
For example, some multiculturalists assert that African
Americans have no ties to Europeans, and thus are deserving
of alternative curriculums. This assertion is based on the
premise that (a) African America has any connection to Africa and (b)that Caucasian America has a conscious connection to Europe. Contained within the self affirmation and reculturization movements is an implied assertion that members of an ethnic heritage perform better if the curriculum
centers upon, and glorifies, their ethnic affiliation. 28 Distorting history for the purposes of creating cultural self-esteem
marginalizes every ethnicities' rightful ownership of a communal American History. 29
American History cannot help to have somewhat of a
European bias, for its socio-political makeup stems mostly
from the European experience. Yet, just as any supposed connection of sixth generation immigrants to the Old World seems
absurd, self-ethnification after 300 years in this country can
be thought of as "play-acting." 30 Creating a historically ethnic identity distinct from "American" has often resulted not
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from a people's movement, but rather due to a few, wellestablished intellectuals, professors, and writers. 31 If the supposed ethnicity that ignores the presence of any collective
American experience finds license in a curriculum, then the
results could not be more debilitating. 32 If the criterion for
teaching becomes ethnic pride and self-esteem, which some
suggest has already occured then the goals of education in a
democratic state no longer matter. Certain things cannot be
taught and areas closed off to conversation readily appear. If
every ethnic or religious group claims the right to approve or
veto what is taught in public schools, multiculturalism becomes ethnocentrism, which is an inherently racist and undemocratic proposition. 33
The implications of conservative or universal notions of
ethics education have equally nefarious consequences. Universalists such as Bennett say that values are the key to stability in society and they are best inculcated in the early years.
He does not care how the values are acquired and would presumably prefer to avoid reasoning among students, as evident in the values clarification debate. 3 4 If we consider that
the logical progression of multiculturalism is ethnocentric and
resistant to a continued conversation on all topics, it resembles
the far-right. Conservative universalists also demand centrist
goals and the closing of areas to conversation. Both views
entertain many of the same thoughts in policy as do totalitarian regimes. Pure indoctrination of "traditional" values, regardless of ideological bent, appear not at all meaningful and
only beget conclusions that have little or no thought supporting them.
Thus, educators must instead focus on the reasoning of
values. Telling a student what is right or wrong is not democratic, but defining ways of reaching a conclusion that instructs the morally "right" way to act is not only a teachable
moment, it is the keystone of social education. We must be
continually vigilant and aware of the omnipresent attempts
of ethics inculcation in order to preserve the freedom to question and reason, an inherent and necessary feature of education in a democratic society.

The Alternative: Dewey's Reflective

Morality

Dewey's conception of ethics in education offers an alternative to relativism, universalism, and cognitive based ethics education. For Dewey, the central purpose of schooling
was to "develop in students a critical intelligence and disposition that would be consistent with their actions as socially
responsible citizens" 35 — a ringing endorsement for the centrality of ethics education in social education. Dewey's conception of "reflective morality" coincides with "reflective
thinking," as it demands that students draw on moral experiences and weigh ethical theories to conclude the proper action. But Dewey noted that there can be no such thing as
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reflective morality unless people seriously ask h o w they
should act and why they should do so. 36 In order for reflective morality to occur, "closed areas" must b e c o m e open and
any moral didacticism removed, making all personal and
public dilemmas available for student reflection.
Reflective morality is centered upon the notion of respice
finem, or having the ends in view. In his Ethics. D e w e y used
the example of hedonism to illustrate respice finem:
Consider how you will come out if you act upon the desire you
now feel; count the cost. Calculate consequences over a period of time. Circumspection, prudent estimate of the whole
course of consequences set in train, is the precondition of attaining satisfaction or the Good. All folly and stupidity consist
in failure to consider the remote, the long run, because of the
engrossing and blinding power exercised by some present intense desire.37
H e d o n i s m is an excellent example of an ethical code that
offers students a logical choice for ethical action and a consequence of that action. E v e n though D e w e y was primarily
teleological in disposition, he suggested consideration of the
i m m e d i a t e ethical implications themselves in addition to
longer-term considerations. D e w e y allowed for consultation
of all theory when m o v i n g f r o m m o t i v e to consequence,
which is the usual fissure in ethical thought. D e w e y bridged
this distinction, for motive and consequence are not " t w o
different things but two poles of the s a m e thing." 3 8 Reflective morality makes all possible ethical theories available for
students to formulate decisions. For example, a student w h o
views a situation in light of Hedonism might see their initial
action as debilitating in the long term, which would suggest
consultation of other ethical theories.
W h a t is central to the "ends in v i e w " or respice finem
approach to ethics education is to provide critical moral reflection that does not allow f o r hard and fast rules. T h e
"golden rule" is an e x a m p l e that provides a point of view
that d e m a n d s consideration of particular acts that affirm the
interests of others, as well as our own. 39 Dewey warned against
principles that have hard and fast rules and suggested that
various theories are not rival systems that must be accepted
or rejected en bloc, but rather as adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct so that "the student is put in
a position to j u d g e the p r o b l e m s of conduct for himself." 4 0
D e w e y did not endorse respice finem wholesale because he
understood the varied interpretations of the " e n d " with specific regard to students. T h e ethical f r a m e w o r k of many high
school students is Epicurean or Stoic in nature, which accompanies delusions of invincibility and general affinity for
the ephemeral. 4 1 D e w e y suggested that these conceptions of
the " e n d " are usually only afforded to the short-sighted or
greedy individuals w h o only act with regard to ends that are
i m m u n e to fluctuation. 4 2
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Throughout their lives, students will c o m e across situations where following a single principle, such as the golden
rule, will not always create the best possible consequences
for themselves or for others. D e w e y believed that to go beyond simplistic guides, an essential element of moral inquiry
needs achievement. This element is the transfer of the weight
and burden of moral action to intelligence. T h e practical
meaning of situations is not always self-evident, as certain
principles would suggest, and therefore conflicting desires
and alternatives must always b e confronted. 4 3 Inculcation of
ethical beliefs denies the existence of alternatives, conflicting beliefs, changing institutions, and personal choice. As
D e w e y noted, the development of reflective morality begins
when o n e asks
Why should I act thus and not otherwise? Why is this right and
that wrong? What right has any one to frown upon this way of
acting and impose that other way? Children make at least a
start upon the road of theory when they assert that the injunctions of elders are arbitrary, being simply a matter of superior
position. Any adult enters the road when, in the presence of
moral perplexity, of doubt as to what is right or best to do, he
attempts to find his way out through reflection which will lead
him to some principle he regards as dependable.44
Asking students to accept the principles which teachers have
attained through reflective morality, at face value, denies the
reflective maturation process that is critical to active and persistent participation in a democratic society.
In addition to "ends in view," D e w e y conceptualized a
"virtue" or " h a b i t " f r a m e w o r k that provides a general guide
to conduct. T h e virtues and ethical habits D e w e y referred to
are always tentative, and never universal. A guide to conduct
in this sense is meant solely as a skeleton of ethical decisionmaking, a flexible f r a m e w o r k that is applicable in every situation. D e w e y suggests that habits are " a d j u s t m e n t s to the
environment," 4 5 which is similar to Piaget's dialectic of cognitive conflict, behavior, and environmental change. 4 6 Dewey
noted that "chastity, kindness, honesty, patriotism, modesty,
toleration, bravery, etc., cannot b e given a fixed meaning,
because each expresses an interest in objects and institutions
which are changing." 4 7 We must therefore conclude that habits and virtues are completely d y n a m i c and must remain flexible to new conditions, even those produced f r o m prior action. In this light, w e cannot think dualistically and therefore
must problemitze virtues and ethical dilemmas for students
to grapple with a life of ethical "gray areas." T h e sine qua
non of teaching ethics is a vision of flexibility, for the future
problems and d i l e m m a s of our students will not only b e predominantly gray and fuzzy in nature, they will also draw upon
infinitely different experiences, situations, and expectations.
As D e w e y noted:
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... it is impossible to prepare the child for any precise set of
conditions. To prepare him for the future life means to give
him command of himself; it means to train him so that he will
have the full and ready use of all his capacities; that his eye
and ear and hand may be tools ready to command, that his
judgment may be capable of grasping the conditions under
which it has to work and the executive forces be trained to act
economically and efficiently.4K
Progress and growth are also essential to D e w e y ' s position. Ethics education should not be conceived as a straightforward m o v e m e n t toward s o m e distant ideal, nor should
progress b e viewed as resulting in final moral perfection.
W h e n progress o c c u r s at all, it is through the guise of experimentation and is only temporary, for progress itself creates
new needs and problems. 4 9 Reflective morality takes into account progress and the reality of inevitable change over time. 50
In order to enable D e w e y ' s theory of ethical action with
ends in view, w e must give students the tools to decide for
themselves what ethical action is for a specific situation and
h o w the c o n s e q u e n c e s of that action can be analyzed. To do
that, the instruction of a variety of codes, eclectically collected f r o m the annals of intellectual history, d e m a n d instruction. T h e s e c o d e s o f f e r perspectives on issues that illuminate
every possible solution and therefore prepare students for all
possible moral d i l e m m a s (see Table l). 5 1
Table I: Ethical Codes for Reflective Morality
1. Ethical Relativism-lhe truth of a moral judgment depends on whether a culture
recognizes the principle in question.
2. Ethical Egoism-one should always act according to their perceived best interests.
3. Virtue(Aretaic) Ethics-emphasis on character and being a certain type of person
w h o w i l l no doubt manifest his or her being in appropriate actions.
4. Hedonism-pleasure is the only intrinsic positive value and pain is the only thing
that has negative intrinsic value. All other values are derived from these two.
5. Absolutism-There is at least one moral absolute that is universally binding; it can
never be overridden by another principle.

Conclusion
Education in a democracy has no place for didactic pedagogy, in particular with regard to ethics education. W h e n curriculum is aligned to political and religious considerations,
or the personal opinions of teachers, the educational inputs
are not aligned with the development of students' analytical
and reasoning skills. If w e want students to be critical thinkers, we must then reject relativist and dogmatic theories of
ethics. Critical thinking is not mere questioning or criticism
for its own sake, but thinking in the sense of establishing
premises and reasoning through to conclusions. 5 5 Critical
thinking is reflection built by specific intellectual standards
and not by "correctness," romantic sociohistoric inaccuracies, or cultural conservatism, and it is essential to the perpetuation of a democracy.
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